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In this paper, I argue that consequentialism as a lived practice is inadequate for ethi-
cal decision-making on the grounds that its conception of actions and consequences 
locks out deeply important ethical considerations. First, I review consequentialism’s 
development and detail the logic of its decision procedure. I give examples of con-
sequentialist decision-making in other areas. I then show how its application in rela-
tion to others evinces a failure to capture certain important features of ethical action, 
namely attitude and disposition. Following an analysis of what considering these 
concepts entails, I explicate why consequentialism cannot admit attitude and dispo-
sition into its moral calculus.
I want to examine consequentialism not as a well thought-out philosophical posi-
tion, but as a tendency in modern thought and ethical decision-making. While not 
all forms of utilitarianism are necessarily consequentialist, the deeply utilitarian un-
derpinnings of Anglo-American economic and political thought made the diffusion 
of consequentialist ethics possible. Utilitarianism is rooted in the work of Jeremy 
Bentham, who holds that choice worthy actions are those that result in the greatest 
amount of happiness for the greatest number of people1. Concentration on bringing 
about the best consequences, at least in the Anglo-American sphere, emerges from 
utilitarianism’s development. Producing good consequences is the central ethical 
concern for the utilitarian Henry Sidgwick, whom Elizabeth Anscombe pinpoints as 
the transitional figure between classical utilitarianism and consequentialism.2 She 
argues that his formulation of intention is such that one is responsible for all the 
foreseeable consequences of one’s action.3 An agent deciding on an action would 
then do well to shift her focus from evaluating the kinds of actions she can choose to 
working out all of their potential consequences, as she is answerable even for those 
she does not intend. This shift in focus leads to the view that Anscombe attributes 
to G.E. Moore and subsequent consequentialists, wherein “‘the right action’ is the 
action which produces the best possible consequences.”4 What follows, she asserts, 
is that for someone to “[act] for the best in the particular circumstances,” she must 
evaluate her action “according to [her] judgment of [its] total consequences.”5 Speak-
1  James E. Crimmins, “Jeremy Bentham,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, February 01, 2017, 
accessed January 12, 2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bentham/.
2  G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy 33, no. 124 (January 1958): 9, accessed 
January 12, 2018, http://www.pitt.edu/~mthompso/readings/mmp.pdf.
3  Ibid.
4  Ibid. 7
5  Ibid. 8
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ing in terms of “total consequences” renders consequentialism a calculative ethics in 
which an agent considering action A at time t enumerates its possible consequences, 
weighs the worth of each one, and sums the consequences of A for comparison with 
those of alternative actions B, C, …, etc. 
Consequentialism, as I’ve described it above, requires the agent to conceive of ac-
tions and consequences as discrete events, evaluative units that can be compared 
to one another and summed together. An agent chooses from a number of actions, 
e.g., “Given this set of constraints, I can do A, B, or C.” She must then generate a list of 
probabilities, the consequences she thinks likeliest: “Doing A will result in α, which is 
a good thing to happen, but β’s being likely is bad and a reason not to do A; the good 
consequence of B is γ, but δ would be a bad thing to happen; etc.” A consequence of 
any action is also forgoing the other actions and their consequences (e.g. “If I do A, I 
’m not going to do B or bring about γ”) and the action itself. The total consequences 
of action A would thus be A itself, α, and β, which the agent can compare to those of 
actions B and C. Alternatively, the agent can start by asking, “How do I bring about 
α, given that α would be a good thing to happen?” and answer with a list of possible 
actions that are reasonably likely to cause α, working out the other consequences 
as well. Part of what makes this calculative form of ethics so tempting is its linear 
approach to decision-making. The agent neatly orders events in a sequence with a 
clear beginning (the action) and ending (the consequences), making it seem simple 
and straightforward to trace outcomes back to a particular action. Consequentialist 
calculation also lends itself well to quantitative analysis, even at a layperson’s level 
where roughly estimating results must suffice in place of more sophisticated calcu-
lus, giving one the sense that an action’s success or failure is measurable. 
Given its tidy appearance, the spread of consequentialism is unsurprising. Its diffu-
sion is evident in a number of areas. Cost-benefit analysis is used in most large-scale 
enterprises such as business, healthcare, and government, and in its weighing of 
outcomes just is consequentialist. A consequentialist framework is also the starting 
point for expected utility decision theory, wherein the rational agent acting under 
uncertainty “should prefer the option with greatest expected desirability or value.”6 
The individual is essentially choosing according to the best overall consequences she 
expects, the criteria for “best” being most desirable or valuable to her given the cir-
cumstances. A more concrete example of consequentialism appears in the PLUS Ethi-
6  Katie Steele and H. Orri Stefánsson, “Decision Theory,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
December 16, 2015, , accessed January 5, 2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/decision-
theory/#VNMRepThe.
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cal Decision Making Model widely taught in ethics and compliance education pro-
grams and used in compliance training for a variety of fields. In the seven-step model, 
the consequentialist framework is made explicit in the third and fourth steps, “Iden-
tify available alternative solutions” and “Evaluate the identified alternatives.”7  The 
third step entails the agent considering at least three, ideally five or more, alternative 
actions for dealing with the problem at hand, and the fourth step involves evaluating 
the “positive and negative consequence” of each choice and the likelihood of those 
consequences.8 In her decision-making, the agent also considers organization policy 
and principles, laws and regulations, and her “personal definition of right, good and 
fair.”9 What these models and the consequentialist approach in general leave out is 
consideration of the attitude with which someone approaches a problem. Attitudes 
form part of a person’s disposition, the orientation of her thoughts and feelings, 
which gives her actions qualities that can affect their outcomes. The ways in which 
action can be described reveal the importance of both attitude and disposition in act-
ing well, and brings into question whether or not consequentialism admits enough 
ethical content into its calculus to be viable as a lived practice. 
Whatever the content of her action, an agent has in mind a particular description 
under which she intends it. But, as Anscombe observes, “[A] single action can have 
many different descriptions,” and the agent “may know that [she] is doing a thing 
under one description, and not under another.”10 Witnesses to an action can give de-
scriptions that conflict with an agent’s intention in acting. A mother, for example, 
may intend to do what she judges is beneficial for her child and choose actions that 
she believes will result in the best possible outcomes; yet, she may find herself in a 
constant dispute with the child about her actions. The mother may describe what 
she’s doing with her two daughters after school as follows: “I am helping them with 
their homework so they’ll get higher marks in class.” Her intention is to help her girls 
bring up their grades, but one of her daughters describes the action, “You are doing 
my homework for me”; “You are making me look stupid in front of my sister”; “You 
are playing favorites again.” These are not descriptions under which the mother in-
tended her action. Nonetheless, they are all true, given the personal history between 
mother and daughter that underlies the action. The mother’s failure to act well lies 




10  G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2000), 11.
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in the details that never occur to her and that her alienated daughter cannot fail to 
notice: the tone of her voice or the tiniest change in her expression, the slight in-
consistencies in how she treats the two sisters–all the sort of thing that betray her 
even as she tells them, and really believes, that she has no favorites and is just trying 
to act for the best. For her daughter the contrary evidence appears not in what she 
does, but the way in which she does it. The child’s descriptions of her action indicate 
that her mother takes a certain attitude toward her, perhaps one of exasperation at 
her inability to keep pace with her sister. This attitude taken over the history of their 
relationship reinforces the mother’s extant disposition for thoughtlessness. The im-
pact of her attitude toward her daughter and the disposition that she has cultivated 
over a lifetime never enter the mother’s consideration of her action’s performance. 
Her attention is on the future state of affairs that she aims to bring about: higher 
grades indicate academic success, which in the long run increases university options 
and improves future job prospects. In all her calculation, however, the mother never 
considers the qualitative aspect of her action. By aiming at good consequences, she 
leaves out morally salient details of interacting with her daughter. Though she in-
tends to help her child, she succeeds more in hurting her.
One might protest that a mother-child relationship is very emotionally charged, and 
a consequentialist procedure calls for some objectivity in judgment. Let us look at a 
more straightforward decision. Two nurses caring for the same elderly patient can 
separately conclude that of the available options to treat this patient’s high heart 
rate, administering Drug X is the most likely to succeed with the fewest side effects. 
The nurses are to ensure that the patient takes his medicine daily in order to keep his 
heart rate down. When asked, “What are you doing?” they can both answer either, 
“Administering Drug X” or, “Bringing down my patient’s heart rate.” But one nurse 
finds that when she administers the drug, his heart rate stays about the same. She 
is baffled, as her colleague successfully treated the problem the day before. The fail-
ure in lowering her patient’s heart rate is therefore not precisely traceable to the ad-
ministering of the drug. The source of failure lies elsewhere. Had anyone thought to 
ask the patient, “What is she doing?” while this nurse administered Drug X, he would 
have described the action thus: “She’s snapping at me to take my medicine, and she’s 
making me nervous.” In this case, too, the failure is in the action’s performance. The 
nurse’s curt instruction is symptomatic of an attitude she holds generally. Whenever 
she habitually engages in e.g. complaining about having to answer the same ques-
tion repeatedly from one patient, she consents to hold this impatient attitude. She 
may not have been impatient before becoming a nurse, but over time the attitude 
gets cultivated into her disposition such that she becomes characteristically impa-
tient. 
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An objection may be raised here: couldn’t an agent, tracing bad outcomes to the per-
formance of her action, adjust her behavior to elicit better ones? If the nurse can 
recognize that her poor performance was a consequence of complaining about her 
patients, the nurse can simply choose different actions. She can make a point of 
praising her patients to colleagues or keep silent altogether. Choosing one of these 
actions where she once would have complained will result in a better performance 
when interacting with patients that annoy her. The outcomes of her actions will then 
be more likely to bear out her intentions.
But this linear approach leaves the connection between the nurse’s habit and the 
interaction between her and the patient unclear. Her choice not to express her nega-
tive thoughts and feelings, perhaps even going so far as to conceal them beneath a 
complimentary veneer, deals only with superficial behavior outside of the nurse’s 
relationship to her patient. The psychological structures underlying her poor perfor-
mance with the patient are thus left intact. How she relates to certain patients is not 
a consequence of discrete actions chosen over a period of time, but the product of 
thinking and feeling a certain way about them. Correcting behavior with the inten-
tion of bringing about good consequences is insufficient for acting well in relation 
to others. What is needed to act well in one’s relationships are qualities beyond the 
ability to reason out an action’s possible consequences. The cultivation of beneficial 
qualities in a disposition demands a long-term commitment. We must have the will 
to act according to virtue.
Virtue, Philippa Foot argues, belongs to the will.11 But there is more to willing than 
just intending. The above examples of the mother and nurse fall under what Foot 
calls “the interesting class of cases” among those in which the failure is in the ac-
tion’s performance, but “there is no possibility of shifting the judgement to previous 
intentions.”12 Though the mother and the nurse chose their actions with the intention 
of helping their charges, they showed qualities, namely, insensitivity and impatience, 
that people generally find distasteful. Foot attributes the failure to “the disposition of 
the heart,” stating that a person “sometimes [...] succeeds where another fails not be-
cause there is some specific difference in their previous conduct but rather because 
his heart lies in a different place.”13 All the details of someone’s performance reveal 
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the orientation of her “innermost desires,” i.e. her attitude, which indicates the qual-
ity of her disposition.14 In the mother’s and nurse’s cases, they can say truthfully that 
they mean to help, but fail in that their attitudes do not cohere with their intentions. 
Coherence in aim and desire appears in Foot’s example of generosity: she observes 
that we usually discern whether or not someone is genuinely generous by her delight 
“in the good fortune of others.”15 A person may aim at a good outcome when she en-
gages in giving, but we would not call her generous if she begrudges the cost of her 
action. Foot notes that these “small reactions of pleasure and displeasure [are] often 
the surest signs of [one’s] moral disposition.”16 The will, in the sense of both aiming 
and desiring, to act well captures the minutiae of an action to which others react. A 
person’s will extends beyond any discrete event, encompassing her short-term inten-
tions but remaining even after they cease. The will runs through her life, permeating 
all of her interactions and every decision she is called upon to make. 
Because the process for choosing her actions only deals with discrete events, the 
consequentialist cannot admit “will” in the above sense into her moral vocabulary, 
nor can she have any rich discussion of disposition and its qualities. She is unable 
to describe an action as, e.g., courageous or generous because she ties the moral 
worth of her actions to their consequences, and one cannot describe a consequence 
as being courageous or generous. The most the agent can say is that it was good, 
beneficial, or desirable. But what does this really mean? Peter Geach contends that 
“good” is not an adjective like “red” or “sweet” that can stand apart from the object 
it describes.17 Though defining a “good human action” presents its own difficulties, 
one can say a courageous act was good if one takes courage as a quality essential to 
living well. We can make sense of good actions in light of Foot’s conception of will 
as both aim and desire: Geach points out that “an action’s being a good or bad hu-
man action is of itself something that touches the agent’s desires.”18 But an A’s being 
called good or bad does not affect our desires unless an A is what’s at stake for us. We 
would not choose, for example, a bad knife over a good one, since we want knives 
that are suitable for the purpose of cutting foods. A bad knife cannot do the same job 
as a good knife, and it would affect our choice in a department store if we overheard 
14  Ibid. 5
15  Ibid. 
16  Ibid. 
17  P.T. Geach, “”Good and Evil”,” Analysis 17, no. 2 (1956): 33, accessed January 12, 2018, 
doi:10.2307/3326442.
18  Ibid. 40
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someone calling a knife for sale bad. We choose our actions and, according to Geach, 
our “manner of acting” or the way in which we perform our actions.19 For someone 
desiring to act well, calling an action or the way in which it is performed “good” influ-
ences her choice if she is deliberating what to do and how to do it. Since desire is part 
of the will, applying the terms good and bad to an action also touches on our com-
mitment to developing a good disposition. 
Consequences, however, cannot simply be called good or bad. A consequence is a 
happening, not specific to moral actions. The only difference between it and the word 
“event” is that a consequence occurs after an action, whereas we can use “event” in 
reference to occurrences unrelated to human choices. Like “thing,” “event” and “con-
sequence” are empty words that stand in for actual content. So, on Geach’s view, ask-
ing whether a consequence is good or bad would be pointless unless “consequence” 
was specified by a context.20 To use his example, one cannot sensibly say that killing 
Caesar had a bad consequence. The emptiness of “consequence” must be filled with 
some content: “Caesar’s murder was a bad thing to happen to a living organism, a 
good fate for a man who wanted divine worship for himself, and again a good or bad 
act on the part of his murderers.”21 The same applies for beneficial and desirable con-
sequences; for we can ask, “Beneficial for whom? Desirable in virtue of what?” No 
future state of affairs can be called good in and of itself. It is therefore incoherent to 
say that one should choose an action according to the best possible consequences. 
This confusion makes consequentialism inadequate as a lived practice. Moreover, 
without a way to discuss and adequately correct attitude and disposition, the conse-
quentialist is left with little ethical content by which to judge her actions.  
On paper, the consequentialist procedure appears orderly. As a lived practice, how-
ever, it leads to much confusion about what is ethically important not only for mak-
ing a single decision, but also for acting well generally. Yet, the appeal of continuing 
to make ethical decisions in this way lies precisely in consequentialism’s inability to 
deeply consider attitude and disposition. Focusing on bringing about a certain out-
come is much less unnerving than focusing on one’s character defects and having a 
will to continually correct them. Aiming to become a different kind of person takes a 
great deal of interior work and honesty with oneself, something the consequentialist 
procedure does not encourage. Consequentialism’s diffusion into the wider culture is 
19  Ibid.
20  Ibid. 40-41
21  Ibid. 41
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worrisome in that it enables a lack of self-awareness, which alienates a person from 
others even as she tries to do what she believes is good for them.
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